Submitted by David Stockman – The Contra Corner Blog
Ben Bernanke’s skin is as thin, apparently, as is his comprehension of honest economics. The emphasis is on the “honest” part because he is a fount of the kind of Keynesian drivel that passes for economics in the financially deformed world that the Bernank did so much to bring about.
Just recall that he first joined the Fed way back on 2002 after an academic career of scribbling historically superficial and blatantly misleading monographs about the 1930s. These were essentially zeroxed from Milton Friedman’s monumental error about the cause of the Great Depression. In a word, Friedman and Bernanke pilloried the Fed for not going on a bond buying spree during 1930-1932 and thereby stopping the shrinkage of money and credit.
In fact, excess reserves in the banking system soared by 12X during those four years, interest rates were at rock bottom and the US economy was saturated with idle cash. So there was no financial stringency——not the remotest aspect of a great monetary policy error.
Instead, what actually happened was that the US banking system was massively insolvent after a 12-year credit boom fueled by the Fed’s printing presses. This first great credit bubble arose initially from the Fed’s maneuvers to fund the massive war production surge of 1915-1919 and then from its fostering of a vast domestic and international credit bubble during the Roaring Twenties.
Alas, none of the Fed governors during the 1930-1932 credit contraction had graced the lecture halls of Princeton. But to nearly a man they knew you can’t push on a string, and that a healthy economy requires that busted loans and soured speculations must be purged from the financial system in order for sustainable growth to resume.
Bernanke has never had a clue about this truth. As I showed in The Great Deformation, what he got wrong about the early 1930’s—– he replicated in spades after the September 2008 financial crisis:
Upon becoming chairman of the Fed, Bernanke then foisted the Fisher-Thomas-Friedman deflation theory upon the nation’s economy in a panicked response to the Wall Street meltdown of September 2008. Yet monetary deflation was no more the cause of the 2008 crisis than it had been the cause of the Great Depression.
The monetary populists of the 1920s and 1930s, including Professor Fisher, had “cause and effect” backward. The sharp reduction after 1929 in the money supply was an inexorable consequence of the liquidation of bad debt, not an avoidable cause of the depression. The measured money supply (M1) even in those times consisted mostly of bank deposit money rather than hand-to-hand currency. And checking account money had declined sharply as an arithmetic consequence of the collapse of what had previously been a fifteen-year buildup of bad loans and speculative credit. During 1929–1933 commercial bank loans outstanding declined from $36 billion to $16 billion. Not surprisingly, as customer loan balances fell sharply, so did checking accounts or what can be termed “bank deposit money” as opposed to currency in circulation. The latter actually grew by $1.1 billion during the four years after 1929, to about $5.5 billion.
By contrast, it was the loan-driven checking account portion of M1 which dried up, declining from $25 billion to $17 billion over the same period. And the reason was no mystery: the way banks create demand deposits is to first issue loan credits to their customers. Indeed, in the modern world money supply follows credit, and rarely do central bankers inordinately restrict the growth of the latter.
In truth, loan balances and checking account money rose to inordinate heights during the financial bubble preceding the 1929 crash and unavoidably declined thereafter. This had nothing to do with causing the depression. The real reason the American economy was stalled in the early 1930s is that it had lost its foreign customers.
The reduction of M1 owing to the liquidation of bad credit, by contrast, was a sign of returning financial health. Indeed, the major component of bank credit shrinkage had been the virtual evaporation of the $9 billion of margin loans against stock prices that had reached lunatic levels before the crash. In blaming the Fed for the Great Depression, therefore, Professors Friedman and Bernanke implicitly held that the Fed should have underwritten the margin-loan-based speculative mania of 1926–1929 in order to keep M1 from shrinking!
That’s the essence of the matter. Bernanke thought the 2008 crisis was a replay of the fictional world of his so-called Great Depression scholarship. Given half the chance by the clueless White House pols—-so-called conservatives who appointed a thorough-going Keynesian to the most powerful economic job in the world——-this time he did underwrite the speculative mania that preceded the crash. So doing, he took the Fed balance sheet into the netherworld of monetary crankdom. Continue reading
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